Woofun AI reports that Coldcard has instituted a strict mandate requiring 65 key presses for new seed generation, compelling users with exposed funds to migrate immediately following a critical seed exploit. This directive addresses a vulnerability where device randomness was compromised, necessitating immediate action for those relying on affected firmware versions.

The deeper driver is the distinction between hardened and compromised workflows: owners using the current fixed release can proceed with the hardened process, while those relying on seeds from affected firmware must generate new seeds and transfer funds unless a specific dice-roll exception applies. Standard seed creation now mandates combining fresh device entropy with one required human input source, defined as at least 65 key presses at unpredictable intervals, 50 rolls of a physical six-sided die, or 128 physical coin flips. This requirement reduces reliance on the wallet's random-number generator alone. Migration is not required for this RNG flaw when the user added at least 50 fair, independent, and private physical die rolls through the affected workflow and never recorded or exposed the sequence. Fewer rolls, or uncertainty about those conditions, means the user should migrate.

Per Woofun AI, Block traced the original defect to code that could route requests to a deterministic MicroPython fallback because a feature flag defined as zero was treated as present. Mandatory human input adds outside entropy to new standard seeds, limiting damage if device randomness fails again, though it cannot retroactively add entropy to a seed that already exists. Coldcard treats the mixed flow differently from the advanced Dice Rolls Only option, which excludes hardware randomness and requires 50 rolls for a 12-word seed or 99 for a 24-word seed.

The firmware package reaches signing and data paths too, binding USB review to a staged PSBT checksum, rechecking transaction bytes before signing, blocking SIGHASH_SINGLE modes by default, restricting USB downloads to the current encrypted-session result, and validating firmware file length. It adds persistent RNG-fault stops, a boot-time hardware-RNG linkage check, more Delta Mode isolation, and active-wallet backup behavior.

This incident underscores the fragility of purely digital entropy sources in hardware wallets. As Coldcard enforces mandatory human input for new standard seeds, users must recognize that device randomness fails without external verification. The inability to retroactively add entropy to an existing seed means migration remains the only viable path for compromised accounts.